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MAINTAINING THE PRIVACY OF PERSONAL
INFORMATION: THE DPPA AND THE RIGHT OF
PRIVACY
I. INTRODUCTION
Society is currently struggling with an inevitable side effect of the
information age-the erosion of personal privacy. Consequently, people are
becoming increasingly protective of their identities and their privacy. A balance
must be struck between the free flow of information upon which our growing
economy relies and the individual's right to maintain privacy, personal dignity,
and anonymity in an ever-encroaching and crowded world.
It is well settled that the United States Constitution recognizes a right to
privacy in certain contexts.' However, the United States Supreme Court has yet
to determine whether this right extends to information already disclosed to the
government. Although that issue arose in Condon v. Reno,2 a Fourth Circuit
case involving the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA),3 the
United States Supreme Court did not address the issue on appeal in Reno v.
Condon.4 Instead the court focused solely on the issue of whether the DPPA
violated the federalism principles of the Tenth Amendment.' However, the
Court inReno did determine that Congress had constitutional authority to enact
a law protecting the privacy of personal information collected by the state
departments of motor vehicles. 6
1. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) (recognizing that individuals
possess privacy interests in personal medical information); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484-85 (1965) (recognizing a right to privacy from government intrusion into personal
matters such as family planning). But see American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO v.
Department of Hous. and Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (expressing
uncertainty as to whether the Constitution protects a right to privacy in personal information).
While the circuits are split over whether the Constitution recognizes a right to privacy in
personal information, the Fourth Circuit is among the majority of circuits which recognize such
a right. See, e.g., Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990).
2. Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998). The district court case of the same name,
Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977 (D.S.C. 1997), will be referred to as the "District Court case"
in this Note. The Fourth Circuit opinion will be referred to as "Condon."
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), amended by Act of Oct. 9, 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106-69, § 350, 113 Stat. 986, 1025-26 (1999).
4. Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000)
5. Id. at 671 n.2 (noting that the issue was not brought up by the government in its brief
to the court).
6. Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672 (holding that the enactment of the DPPA was a valid exercise
of congressional power under the authority of the Commerce Clause and that the application of
the DPPA to the states did not constitute impermissible commandeering of the states in
contravention of the Tenth Amendment).
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This Note addresses the DPPA, South Carolina's challenge to the
constitutionality of the DPPA, and the unresolved question of whether the
United States Constitution's right to privacy should extend to information
already turned over to the government. Part II explores the operation and
purpose of the DPPA, the congressional authority to enact it, and South
Carolina's recent challenge to the DPPA. Part II also discusses the federalism
concerns expressed by South Carolina over the DPPA and the resolution of this
issue by the United States Supreme Court in Reno v. Condon.7 Part III
examines the following Constitutional issues: (1) whether the United States
Constitution guarantees Americans a right to privacy in personal information;
(2) the United States Supreme Court's reactions when confronted with this
issue; and (3) the balancing test used by the Fourth Circuit in personal
information disclosure cases. The focus of this Note rests primarily in Part III's
discussion of the privacy issues addressed but not definitively resolved in the
course of the challenge to the DPPA. This Note intends to clarify and offer an
opinion about what has become an issue that many courts have been reluctant
to address because of the murky state of the law concerning the scope and
protections of the right to privacy.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Driver's Privacy Protection Act
One of the latest chapters in the ongoing tug-of-war between the public's
right to know and individual privacy interests has been the controversial
disclosure and sale of the personal information contained in Department of
Motor Vehicles (DMV) records to third parties. In response to this
controversial practice, Congress enacted the Driver's Privacy Protection Act
of 1994 to restrict the disclosure of drivers' personal information by state
DMVs. s The DPPA's original purpose was as a crime prevention measure,9 as
well as "to protect the personal privacy and safety of licensed drivers consistent
with the legitimate needs of business and government"'" Over time, however,
what Congress perceived as legitimate business needs became more restrictive,
and the amendment of the act in 1999 ultimately resulted in direct marketers
being denied access to such information absent express consent of the
individual driver."
7. Id.
8. 18"U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), amended byActof Oct. 9, 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106-69, § 350, 113 Stat. 986, 1025-26 (1999).
9. See 140 CONG. REc. 7929 (1994) (statement of Rep. Goss); 139 CONG. REc. 27,327
(1993) (statement of Rep. Moran).
10. S. Res. 1589, 103rd Cong. §l(b), 139 CONG. REC. 26,266 (1993) (enacted).
11. Act of Oct. 9, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-69, § 350, 113 Stat. 986, 1025-26 (1999)
(requiring states to have an opt-in policy whereby direct marketers cannot obtain an individual's
personal information from the DMV without the individual's express consent).
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The impetus for the DPPA's enactment was the 1989 murder of actress
Rebecca Schaeffer, star of the television series "My Sister Sam."' 2 A stalker
shot and killed the actress in front of her apartment after obtaining her unlisted
home address from the California DMV. 3 This brutal murder illuminated the
threat to the public from the relatively easy public access to individuals'
personal information in DMV records. Before the DPPA took effect, most
states freely turned over DMV information to whomever requested it with few
restrictions.' 4 Because of such lax restrictions on the release of personal
information from many states' DMVs, would-be criminals had easy access to
home addresses and telephone numbers of potential victims. 5 Congress was
keenly aware of a need to protect members of the public from this threat to
their safety as several of the bill's sponsors gave specific examples of the kind
of harm that had come to victims of those who obtained this information.'6
Public outrage over the Schaeffer murder and Congressional concern for public
safety prompted the inclusion of the DPPA in the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994.17
The DPPA both mandates and restricts the disclosure of the personal
information contained in DMV records.' Under the DPPA, states must make
available drivers' information when the information is required to carry out
certain federal statutes. 9 The states may also make information available at
their discretion for public safety, judicial, insurance, anti-fraud, and motor
vehicle related purposes.20 Information may also be disseminated to direct
marketers under subsection (b)(12), provided certain guidelines have been
met." Under the original 1994 version of the DPPA, the release of drivers'
12. See 137 CONG. REc. 27,327 (1993).
13. Ironically, the stalker obtained this information through a private investigator-a
source that the DPPA still permits to have access to the personal information contained in DMV
records. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(8); 139 CONG. REc. 27,327 (1993) (statement of Rep. Moran).
14. 139 CONG. REC. 27,327 (1993) (statement of Rep. Moran).
15. 140 CONG. REc. 7929 (1994) (statement of Rep. Goss)
16. 139 CONG. RC. 27,327 (1993) (statement of Rep. Moran) (stating that a group of
thieves in Iowa took the license plate numbers of expensive cars to the DMV to discover the
home addresses of the cars' owners and burglarized the homes); 139 CONG. REC. 29,466 (1993)
(statement of Sen. Boxer) (indicating that a man used the DMV to obtain the home addresses of
several young women and sent them harassing letters); 139 CoNG. REc. 29,462 (1993) (statement
of Sen. Robb) (stating that a woman who visited a doctor who also performed abortions found
black balloons outside her home after a group of anti-abortion activists had seen her car in the
clinic's parking lot and had used her license plate information to obtain her home address from
the DMV).
17. Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796
(1994); see 139 CONG. REC. 27,327 (1993) (statement of Rep. Moran).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 2721.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b). The enumerated statutes are the "Automobile Information
Disclosure Act, the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Saving Act, the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, the Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992, and the Clean Air Act." Id.
20. Id. (including disclosure to private investigators and towing companies among the
acceptable recipients of drivers' personal information.).
21. § 2721 (b)(12).
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personal information to direct marketers was subject to an "opt-out"
requirement. DMVs were required to provide drivers with the opportunity to
indicate their preference that personal information not be disclosed.' In late
1999, however, section (b)(12) was amended to require that states obtain the
express consent of drivers to have their information disclosed to direct
marketers-an "opt-in" requirement.'
The DPPA concerns itself solely with the personal information contained
in DMV records. The DPPA has defined "personal information" as
"information that identifies an individual, including an individual's photograph,
social security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the
5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information."24
One argument by opponents of the DPPA, including the director of the South
Carolina Press Association, is that reporters' investigations in the public
interest, such as determining which school bus drivers have prior DUI
convictions, would be hampered.' However, the information the DPPA
protects does not include an individual's driving record.26 Therefore, the press
may still discover whether an individual school bus driver has a poor driving
record. The DPPA simply limits press access to personal information such as
the individual driver's address, social security number, or whether the driver
has any disabilities. The bill's sponsors recognized the concerns expressed by
members of the press andbusiness community and drafted apiece of legislation
which they believed struck a fair balance between the public's right to know
and the individual's right to privacy.'
The DPPA directly conflicts with the extraordinarily permissive language
of the related South Carolina statute.2 South Carolina Code sections 56-3-510
to 540 permit the DMV to disclose drivers' personal information to any third
party upon the completion of a form certifying that the recipient of the
information will not use it for telephone solicitations.29 Section 545 was added
22. 18 U.S.C. § 2721-2725 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
23. Act of Oct. 9, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-69, § 350, 113 Stat. 986, 1025-26 (1999).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3).
25. Mark Pratt, High Court Says License Data Private: Decision Sparks Debate Over
Freedom ofInformation, States'Rights, Individual Protection, AGUsTA CHRON., Jan. 13, 2000,
at Al, available in 2000 WL 5215520. It is important to note that South Carolina was joined by
seven different press associations as plaintiffs against the United States. See Reno v. Condon,
120 S. Ct. 666 (2000); Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4'h Cir 1998); Condon v. Reno, 972 F.
Supp. 977 (D.S.C. 1997). It is unclear whether the press associations' motivation to join South
Carolina in an action against the United States was fueled in part by this misconception.
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3); 139 CONG. REc. 29,468 (1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer)
("Nothing in this bill will stop the press, insurance companies, employers, or anyone else from
obtaining information about an individual's driving record."). The DPPA does not limit access
to driving records: it protects only personal information as defined above.
27. 139 CONG. REc. 27,327 (1993) (statement of Rep. Moran).
28. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-3-510 to 545 (West Supp. 1999).
29. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-3-5 10 to 540 (West Supp. 1999) (requiring only name, address,
date, reason for request, and the promise of no telephone solicitations.).
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in 1999 to prohibit the disclosure of photographs, social security numbers, and
signatures." South Carolina attempted to address the public safety issue
through later amendments to different code sections imposing fines and light
jail sentences for people who used the DMV information to commit crimes.31
However, the penalties are so light that the deterrence of potential criminal
activity is minimal.32 Now that the Supreme Court has found the DPPA to be
constitutional, South Carolina's policy for the release of personal information
must conform to the DPPA.
By enacting the DPPA, Congress clearly demonstrated an awareness of the
public's privacy fears. Congress also recognized that individuals may retain an
expectation of privacy in the information they disclose to the government.33 In
amending the DPPA, Congress has clearly put the privacy interests of
individuals before the commercial interests of direct marketers.
B. Reno v. Condon
1. Background
South Carolina challenged the DPPA in Federal court, alleging that it
violated the principles of federalism reflected in the Tenth Amendment to the
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-545 (West Supp. 1999).
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1710, §-1720 (West Supp. 1999).
32. See id.
33. See 139 CONG. REc. 29,469 (1993) (statement of Sen. Robb) ("This legislation is
simply designed to close an important loophole that at this point restricts the privacy that I think
most of our citizens believe they have."); 139 CONG. REc. 29,466 (1993) (statement of Sen.
Boxer) (citing a survey reporting that eighty percent of those asked were not comfortable with
the idea ofanother personprocuring the type ofinformation contained in DMV records). Senator
Robb also stated:
The right to privacy, without which the [sic] Americans are not
secure in their own homes, is seriously threatened. It is easy for
anyone anywhere to access information as personal as your
address and phone number, even if they are not listed in the
telephone directory. Even your Social Security number is
available, and the chief agent giving out this information is the
very government that is supposed to protect its citizens.
139 Cong. Rec. 29,469 (1993). Congressional recognition that an individual may have a weighty
expectation ofprivacy in his orherpersonal information contained inDMV records maybe quite
relevant in the courts' privacy analysis discussed infra, Part Ill. Of special importance is that in
amending the DPPA to prohibit direct marketers from obtaining personal information without
an individual's express consent, Congress may have made two assumptions. See Act of Oct. 9,
1999, Pub. L. No. 106-69, § 350, 113 Stat. 986, 1025-26 (1999). First, an individual's privacy
interest in his or herpersonal information may outweigh that ofbusinesses. This may be relevant
to the judicial balancing test discussed infra, Part Ill.B.2. Second, the inclusion of this
amendment may indicate that Congress believes that the individual retains some control over the
dissemination of his or her personal information once it has been disclosed to the government.
2000
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United States Constitution.34 Relying heavily on Printz v. United States3 and
New York v. United States,36 South Carolina argued that the DPPA effectively
commandeered the states and compelled them to become "'unwilling
implementors of federal policy.'
3'
In Reno, the Supreme Court undertook a two part analysis to determine
whether the DPPA was valid under the United States Constitution.38 First, the
Court determined that the DPPA regulated a thing in interstate commerce,
justifying Congress' reliance on the authority granted by the Commerce
Clause.39 Second, the Court found that the DPPA did not violate the Tenth
Amendment's federalism principles.40
2. Commerce Clause
The United States Supreme Court found inReno that the DPPA was a valid
exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.41 South
Carolina was one of approximately thirty-four states in the business of selling
DMV information at the time Congress enacted the DPPA in 1994.42 In the past
few years, South Carolina has made less than $50,000 from these sales.43
Before public outrage stymied the deal, South Carolina had entered into a
$5,000 contract with Image Data, Inc. of New Hampshire to sell the DMV
photographs of roughly 3.5 million individuals for use by the company in
developing an anti-fraud device. 44 The Court determined that the personal
information contained in DMV records is a "thing in interstate commerce"
because Congress found that it has been sold as a commodity to direct
marketers, insurers, and others who regularlyparticipate in interstate commerce
and used the information in furtherance of this commercial activity.45 The Court
then went on to hold that the DPPA did not violate the Tenth Amendment.
34. Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 671. Charlie Condon said that he was not fighting over privacy but
for states' rights. Pratt, supra note 25, at Al.
35. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
36. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
37. Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 671-72 (citing Brief for Respondents at 11).
38. Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 671.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 671-72.
41. Id. at 671; see U.S. CONSr, art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also, 139 CONG. REc. 29,468 (1993)
(statement of Sen. Boxer) (stating that the dissemination of personal information impacts
interstate commerce).
42. 139 CONG. REc. 29,466 (1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer); see also Condon v. Reno,
155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998).
43. Robert S. Greenberger, Privacy Battle Over Databases at High Court, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 10, 1999 at B1, available in 1999 WL-WSJ 24921495. New York made $17 million and
Wisconsin made $8 million in one year offthese sales. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Court Upholds
Drivers' Privacy: Justices Back Congress in Restricting States'Sale of Personal Data, Cm.
TRm., January 13, 2000, at 9, available in 2000 WL 3626098.
44. Pratt, supra note 25, at.
45. Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 671.
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3. Federalism Concerns
The United States Supreme Court appears to have changed course in
upholding the constitutionality of the DPPA inReno v. Condon amidst charges
that the DPPA violated federalism principles." In recent years, the Court has
consistently found in favor of the states when federalism concerns arose.47 The
Court may have somewhat limited the scope of this trend in Reno v. Condon
by rejecting South Carolina's contention that the DPPA violated the Tenth
Amendment.4
Two lines of cases concerning federalism have developed over recent
years. The holdings ofNew Yorkv. United States49 and Printz v. United Statess0
revolve around the authority of the government to instruct the states to
implement federal regulations. The Garcia line of cases found that regulation
of the states is acceptable in the federalist system where the law is one of
general applicability, meaning that it is only incidentally applicable to the
states.-" The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals thought Reno fell within the New
York and Printz line of cases and endorsed the Supreme Court's recent trend
of curtailing the reach of federal regulation. 2
The Fourth Circuit, in determining that the DPPA was an example of the
federal government impermissibly commandeering or imposing
unconstitutional burdens on the states, no doubt believed it was following the
same approach the Supreme Court had typically taken in recent years when
federalism questions arose. 3 However, the Supreme Court deviated from this
trend in Reno and determined that Congress was not overreaching its regulatory
authority because the DPPA does not force states to enact regulations or carry
out federal programs.5 4 Relying on South Carolina v. Baker,5" the Court
explained that "the DPPA does not require the States in their sovereign
capacity to regulate their own citizens," but merely requires states to refrain
from making inappropriate disclosures and "regulates states as the owners of
46. See Foot on Brake: the Supreme Court and Federalism, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22,
2000, at 31 [hereinafter Foot on Brake].
47. Id.; see, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898; New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144.
48. See Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672.
49. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
50. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
51. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
52. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998); Foot on Brake: the Supreme Court
and Federalism, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2000,at 31.
53. It appears to some commentators that the Supreme Court has gone out of its way to
hear cases concerning federalism issues. Id.
54. Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672.
55. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). The Court in Reno summed up Baker's
holding: where a federal law merely "'regulate[d] state activities' rather than 'seeking] to
control or influence the manner in which states regulate private parties,"' states have not been
impermissibly commandeered. Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672 (quoting Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-15).
2000
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databases."56 In so finding, the Court determined that the DPPA is generally
applicable within the meaning of GarCia.
57
In light of the Court's analysis in Reno, in order to be impermissibly
commandeered the states or their officials must be forced to assist in the
implementation of a federal regulatory objective. Where states must refrain
from acting, as was the objective of the DPPA, the states are not
unconstitutionally commandeered even though Congress may be attempting to
control their behavior. The DPPA required no affirmative regulatory action by
the states and therefore did not violate the Tenth Amendment.58 As Justice
Scalia noted in oral arguments, "'[the states] haven't been commandeered at
all.... All you have to do is sit on your hands. What's so hard about that?"' 59
In addition to prohibiting direct marketers from having access to
individuals' personal information absent express consent, the 1999
amendments to the DPPA also tied compliance with the DPPA to federal
highway funding, thereby buttressing the DPPA against attacks on Congress'
authority to enact the DPPA.6° The addition of this amendment prior to oral
arguments made the federalism debate surrounding Reno v. Condon a "'little
academic"' in the eyes of Justice O'Connor.6' Congress' authority to enact the
DPPA was no longer solely tied to the Commerce Clause and thereby restricted
by the principles of federalism. Instead, Congress adopted an incentive-based
approach whereby the availability of federal highway funding was tied to
states' compliance with the DPPA.
With the Court's unanimous decision, the constitutionality of the DPPA
has now been definitively resolved. The enactment of the DPPA was a valid
exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause and did not
violate the principles of federalism underlying our system of government. The
question remains, however, whether an individual retains a right to privacy
under the United States Constitution regarding the personal information
contained in DMV records.
IV. THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: THE ISSUE LEFT UNRESOLVED
A. The Evolution of the Right to Privacy
56. Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 672. The states, as owners of databases, were not acting for a
regulatory purpose, but for a proprietary purpose. Accordingly, the DPPA's control of this type
of state conduct did not involve the states in implementing a regulatory scheme.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Steve Lash, Supreme Court Debates Driver's License Issue: Federal Law Bans State
Sales of Personal Data, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 11, 1999, at -3, available in 1999 WL
24264423 (quoting Justice Scalia).
60. Act of Oct. 9, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-69, § 350, 113 Stat. 986, 1025-26 (1999).
61. Jan Crawford Greenburg, supra note 42, at 9 (quoting Justice O'Connor). Act of Oct.
9, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-69, § 350, 113 Stat. 986, 1025-26 (1999). This amendment assured
states' compliance with the DPPA despite the Fourth Circuit's ruling and the possibility that the
Supreme Court might have upheld its determination that the DPPA was unconstitutional.
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The United States Constitution provides citizens with many express
protections from government wrongs. The Supreme Court has consistently
found additional protections implicit in the Constitution.62 One such protection
is the 'right to privacy."
Laws are merely codified social norms and concepts of individual privacy
have long been incorporated into social norms.64 American jurisprudence
recognizes that private matters should be protected against intrusion by the
government.6 s The United States Supreme Court first recognized a
constitutional 'right to privacy' in certain types of private conduct in Griswold
v. Connecticut." The Court has since wrestled with defining the scope of this
right.
The Supreme Court has distinguished two types of privacy interests an
individual may possess: "One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions."'67 The type of privacy protection
recognized in Griswold falls under the latter category, while the information
contained in DMV records falls under the former.
B. Information Privacy: The Fourth Circuit's Approach
1. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
62. U.S. CONST. amend. IX; see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(recognizing that the constitution affords citizens a right to privacy in certain matters). The
Grinvold Court recognized that "zones of privacy" exist within the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights. Griswold, 381 U.S. at484. Justice Goldberg, in his concurring opinion, expounded upon
one of the majority'sjustifications for the existence of the right to privacy arguing that the Ninth
Amendment was added to the Constitution because the framers did not intend for the Bill of
Rights to be an exhaustive list of rights protected under the Constitution. Griswold, 381 U.S. at
487-491 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The Ninth Amendment reads: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." U.S. CONST. Amend. IX. Justice Goldberg emphasized that:
To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted
in our society as the right of privacy in marriage may be
infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so many words
by the first eight amendments to the Constitution is to ignore the
Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 491.
63. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Walls v. City
of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990).
64. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193,
193-220 (1890); RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW: CAsEs AND
MATERIALs 39 (1999).
65. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
66. Id.
67. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600 (footnotes omitted).
2000
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A right to privacy in personal information has been recognized in the
Fourth Circuit.68 However, an individual's reasonable expectation of
confidentiality constrains this right.69 In Condon, the Fourth Circuit asserted
that neither it nor the Supreme Court "has ever recognized a constitutional right
to privacy with respect to" the type of information contained in DMV records.70
Citing a string of Supreme Court cases, the Fourth Circuit rebutted the
contention that drivers' personal information was protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment's right to privacy and indicated that "'the Fourteenth
Amendment does not override all principles of federalism.''M This reference
clearly suggests that the court firmly couched its privacy decision in its
federalism analysis. Because the Supreme Court's decision in Reno did not
address the right to privacy issue raised in the lower courts, the Fourth Circuit's
privacy analysis must be reevaluated.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Walls v. City of Petersburg explicitly
recognized the existence of a constitutional 'right to privacy' in personal
information. The court indicated that "a right to privacy protects only
information with respect to which the individual has a reasonable expectation
of privacy., 72 The court further found that an individual may not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy where the information the government seeks
is already a matter of public record.73 In Condon, the Fourth Circuit believed
that the personal information contained in DMV records was a matter of public
record as discussed in Walls.74 Because individuals have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the information, they would have no right to privacy
in it.
75
a. Public Record
The information contained in motor vehicle records is detailed. In South
Carolina, it includes a name, address, date and place of birth, telephone
number, social security number, race, height, weight, hair and eye color,
whether an individual has any disabilities or vision problems, and a
68. See Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990).
69. See id.
70. Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 456, 464 (4th Cir. 1998) (indicating that the
information it was referring to included name, address, and telephone number).
71. Condon, 155 F.3d at464 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,469 (1991)).
72. Id. at 193.
73. Id. Walls involved a claim by a government employee that divulging certain personal
information to the government-employer in a background questionnaire violated her right to
privacy. Id. at 189. The questionnaire required her to "[1]ist all marriages you have had and the
present status thereof: If divorced, annulled or separated, give details of date, offending party
as decreed by law, and the reason therefore [sic] on a separate sheet ofpaper .... List every child
born to you." Id. at 190. The court said that "any details that are not part of the public record
concerning [these items]... are private and thus protected." Id. at 193.
74. Condon, 155 F.3d at465.
75. Id.
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photograph. 6 This list is not only more extensive information than the
information determined to be part of the public record in Walls,77 but it is all
linked. This linkage, plus the inclusion of information that is generally not a
matter of public record, such as a list of disabilities and a social security
number, makes the information possessed by the DMV different from the
public record information in Walls. This linkage makes the personal
information contained in DMV record unique and especially valuable to direct
marketers. It also makes the dissemination of the information particularly
invasive to the individual because the privacy interest an individual possesses
in the whole package of information contained in the DMV records may be
greater than the privacy interests in each of the individual pieces of
information.78
b. Expectations of Privacy Relating to the Existence of a Right
to Privacy in Information
In Condon, the Fourth Circuit cited the Supreme Court's statement that
"'pervasive schemes of regulation,' like vehicle licensing, must 'necessarily
lead to reduced expectations of privacy"'79 as support for the proposition that
"individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy" regarding the
76. S.C. CODEANN. §§ 56-1-80, -90,-130,-170 (Law. Co-op. 1991 &West Supp. 1999);
see also 18 U.S.C. §2725(3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) as amended by Act of Oct. 9, 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106-69, § 350, 113 Stat. 986, 1025-26 (1999) (defining "personal information" as
including some of the above items).
77. See supra note 75.
78. While one piece of information may be considered public record and not subject to a
reasonable expectation of privacy, when several of these pieces of information are linked
together, the potential to intrude more deeply into a person's personal sphere of privacy
increases. The privacy interest in the whole may be greater than the sum of its parts because
while not much may be gleaned about an individual through separate bits of information, when
a third party possesses a whole packet of information about an individual, a clearer picture of
that person emerges. That more detailed picture of an individual derived from the linked pieces
of information may cause the individual greater concern and create a greater privacy interest in
the package of information. For example, where a third party simply knows an individual's
telephone number the most he can do is to call the individual. However, when that third party
knows many pieces of information all tied to that same individual, such as name, address, date
of birth, and social security number, the third party may be able to access the individual's bank
records, obtain official documents or credit cards in the individual's name, or worse. If, for
example, a photograph were included in the packet of information a different scenario may arise.
An individual may have no expectation of privacy in his or her appearance, but if a potential
stalker wished to limit his activities to attractive young women, he would merely have to find
the photograph of an attractive young woman and look to the other information linked to the
photograph, such as the potential victim's name, address, and telephone number in order to
locate and harass her. Therefore, the privacy interest in linked information clearly canbe greater
than the sum of the individual pieces of information.
79. Condon, 155 F.3d at 465 (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985));
see also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 113 (1986) (holding that the reasonable expectation
of privacy is diminished as to one's VIN number).
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information found in motor vehicle records."0 Circumstances that reduce an
expectation of privacy, however, do not necessarily eliminate the right to
privacy. The Fourth Circuit does not appear to have made this distinction in
either Walls or Condon. In California v. Carney,"' the owner of a motor home
was found to have reduced expectations of privacy in his motor home because
vehicles are subject to more regulation that conventional homes." However, the
individual in Carney did not lose his right to privacy in the motor home; instead
he found it reduced because of the nature of the thing in which he had a privacy
interest.8 3 Carney reinforces the idea that such 'pervasive schemes of
regulation' do not necessarily lead to the elimination of any existing
constitutional right to privacy. 4
In conducting a privacy analysis, one must also take into account the
reasonable expectation of privacy an individual has in the information - an
expectation which may be reduced by the nature of the information in the
records." It does not appear that the nature of the personal information
contained in DMV records would cause this expectation to be reduced. On the
contrary, because of the linked nature of the records, the privacy expectation
in the personal information record as a whole, once in the hands of the
government, may begreater than the expectations of privacy in each individual
piece of information. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's insistence that there is no
right to privacy in an individual's personal DMV record information may be
flawed.
2. Balancing Test
The right to privacy is not an absolute right, however, as the Fourth Circuit
pointed out in Walls v. City ofPetersburg."6 It may be overcome by a showing
of a compelling government interest.8 In Walls, the Fourth Circuit employed
a balancing test to determine whether the requirement of disclosure of personal
information to the government violated the individual's right to privacy.88 In
the typical case, the balancing test requires the court to weigh the individual's
interest in keeping the information from being disclosed to the government
against the government's interest in obtaining the information.89 Where the case
involves disclosure by the government, it would appear that the courts would
80. Condon, 155 F.3d at464-65.
81. 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
82. Carney, 471 U.S. at 392.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990).
87. Id.
88. Id. See United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3rd Cir.
1980).
89. Walls, 895 F.2d at 192.
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use the same balancing test. Once a right to privacy has been established, the
government must demonstrate "that a compelling governmental interest in
disclosure outweighs the individual's privacy interest."9 Several factors affect
this analysis, including
the type of... [information] requested, the information it
does or might contain, the potential for harm in any
subsequent nonconsensual disclosure .... the adequacy of
safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the degree of
need for access, and whether there is an express statutory
mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable
public interest militating toward access.9'
In the case of the DPPA, the individual's interest in the information must be
greater than that of the government in disseminating it. Congress, in enacting
the DPPA Amendments of 1999, placed the individual's privacy interest in his
or her personal information already disclosed to the government ahead of the
government's interest in selling that information to businesses.92 Perhaps courts
will do the same in the future.
3. Possibility ofDisclosure
The judiciary is keenly aware of the possible dangers associated with the
further public disclosure of information gathered by the government and stored
in computer databases.93 The Walls court's concern for the possibility of abuse
of the information Walls disclosed with the growth of new information
technologies is evident:
Although some of this information [contained in computer
databases] can be useful and even necessary to maintain order
and provide communication and convenience in a complex
society, we need to be ever diligent to guard against misuse.
Some information still needs to be private, disclosed to the
public only if the person voluntarily chooses to disclose it.94
90. Id. In Walls, the court determined that the government possessed a sufficiently
compelling reason to require disclosure of certain personal information because the nature of
Walls' government job was such that the government interests outweighed her personal privacy
interests. Id. at 193-194.
91. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.
92. Act of Oct. 9, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-69, § 350, 113 Stat. 986, 1025-26 (1999).
93. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 579-580; Walls,
895 F.2d at 194-195.
94. Walls, 895 F.2d at 194-95.
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In Walls, the information divulged to the government was kept in a locked file
cabinet.95 The Walls court noted, importantly, that "if this type of information
had been more widely distributed, our conclusions might have been
different."96 This dicta reflects an important concern in our society that has
been expressed on several occasions by both the judiciary and by CongressY
One of the key factors the Fourth Circuit considered in its Walls privacy
analysis was the possibility of further unwarranted disclosure of the
individual's personal information." Since the information to be relinquished to
the government would be kept in a locked file cabinet and the risk of disclosure
was relatively remote, the court determined that Walls's privacy expectations
in the information were reduced.99 However, this analysis is flawed. It is not
that Walls's privacy interest in the information was reduced, but rather that the
government's intrusion into that interest was less. Therefore, the possibility of
future disclosure should enter the analysis when the court balances the
competing interests of the individual and the government, but should not be a
factor in considering the nature or extent of the individual's privacy interest.
4. Right to Informational Privacy as Applied to DPPA
In Reno v. Condon, the Supreme Court was not asked to address the issue
of whether an individual's constitutionally protected right to privacy extends
to situations in which the government discloses information to third parties.'
95. Id. at 194.
96. Id.
97. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721-2725; Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Watson v.
Lowcountry Red Cross, 974 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1992); Walls v. City ofPetersburg, 895 F.2d 188
(4th Cir. 1990). The Third Circuit emphasized this concern in Westinghouse:
Proliferation in the collection, recording and dissemination of
individualized information has made the public, Congress and
the judiciary increasingly alert to the threat such activity can
pose to one of the most fundamental and cherished rights of
American citizenship, falling within the right characterized by
Justice Brandeis as 'the right to be let alone.' Much of the
concern has been with governmental accumulation of data and
the ability ofgovernment officials to put information technology
to uses detrimental to individual privacy, which have been
facilitated by the spread of data banks and by the increasing
storage in computers of sensitive information relating to the
personal lives and activities of private citizens.
Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 576 (internal citations omitted). This discussion seems squarely on
point with the concerns of the DPPA.
98. Walls, 895 F.2d at 194.
99. Id.
100. The United States did not raise this issue to the Supreme Court in Reno, and therefore
it was not addressed by the Court. Reno, 120 S. Ct. at 671 n.2. "In the lower courts, the United
States also asserted that the DPPA was lawfully enacted pursuant to Congress' power under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment .... The District Court and Court of Appeals rejected that
argument .... The United States' petition for certiorari and briefs to this Court do not address
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In light of recent opinions from the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit, this
right may indeed exist.'"' However, these recent cases only address the
disclosure of personal information to the government.
The disclosure of individuals' information by the government presents a
different situation than the disclosure of information to the government. An
important distinction between the two lies in the purpose for which the
information is to be used. Implicit in the government's request of information
is the presumption that the information is being gathered in furtherance of a
legitimate governmental function. This factor is implicitly included in the
balancing analysis the courts employ in disclosure cases. Members of society
must relinquish certain aspects of our identities to the government to help it
govern more effectively. However, when this information is released by the
government for purposes completely unrelated to legitimate public concerns,
the policy perspective changes. The sacrifice of personal privacy is not
necessary for the common good in such contexts.
There is no absolute privacy right with respect to personal information that
would categorically prevent the government from obtaining personal
information. It does appear, however, that an individual's privacy interests in
the information continue even after it has been disclosed to the government.'02
The government's actions in disclosing the information shouldbe subject to the
same balancing test that is applied with respect to disclosures of personal
information to the government. Therefore, the governmental interest in
disseminating the information may not be as compelling as it may have been
when the government collected the information for a legitimate regulatory
purpose.
For example, the government's compelling interest in regulating and
licensing drivers provides adequate justification to overcome any right to
privacy objection an individual may lodge against the government's collection
of his personal information. The compelling governmental purpose which once
justified its collection ceases to exist when the government attempts to
disseminate this same information to third parties. 3 The government would
have to show a different compelling interest to justify further disclosure.
Because of its linked nature, an individual may also possess a greater privacy
interest in the personal information to be disseminated by the DMV. The
combination of a heightened privacy interest and a reduced governmental
interest may lead to a different outcome upon application of the balancing test.
the § 5 issue and, at oral argument, the Solicitor General expressly disavowed any reliance on
it." Id.
101. See Whalen, 589 U.S. at 599-600; Walls, 895 F.2d at 192.
102. This continuation ofprivacy interests seems to be implicit in thejudiciary's concern
with the possibility of further disclosure as an element ofits balancing test. See Whalen, 429 U.S.
at 600-06; Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 579-580; Walls, 895 F.2d at 194-95.
103. The Supreme Court noted in Whalen that "[the right to collect and use such
[medical] data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or
regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures." 429 U.S. at 605.
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The nature of the government's intrusion would necessarily be greater
where the government discloses an individual's personal information to the
public. Disclosure by the government may result in widespread, potentially
infinite dissemination of the individual's information, while disclosure to the
government would generally have a less intrusive result because of the limited
scope of the disclosure. Following the privacy fears expressed in Walls,
Westinghouse and Whalen, a court would appear to be much less inclined to
find that the individual's privacy interests were being adequately protected by
the government in a situation involving unchecked disclosure of an individual's
information by the government. Thus, the DPPA properly prevents such
disclosures, but the judiciary should recognize and address the need for
protection from the invasion of privacy which government disclosure prevents.
IV. CONCLUSION
The DPPA addresses an issue which has increasingly become a focus of
the public's attention-the erosion of personal privacy. According to Reno v.
Condon, Congress did not run afoul of the principles of federalism established
by the Tenth Amendment when it enacted the DPPA. However, whether the
subject matter the DPPA seeks to protect-personal information-is also
implicitly protected by the United States Constitution has been left unresolved.
As the intrusions into personal privacy increase with the expansion of the
information age, the time is right for the Court to definitively address the issue
of whether Americans possess a Constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable intrusions into their personal information. The Court should
address this issue now, before the sphere of privacy surrounding the individual
is whittled away to nothing.
Maureen Maginnis
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